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ABSTRACT
In Plato’s Theaetetus, knowledge is deﬁned as the
intersection of truth and belief, where knowledge
cannot be claimed if something is true but not believed
or believed but not true. Using an example from
neonatal intensive care, this paper adapts Plato’s
deﬁnition of the concept ‘knowledge’ and applies it to
the ﬁeld of quality improvement in order to explore and
understand where current tensions may lie for both
practitioners and decision makers. To increase the
uptake of effective interventions, not only does there
need to be scientiﬁc evidence, there also needs to be
an understanding of how people’s beliefs are changed
in order to increase adoption more rapidly.
Understanding how best to maximise the overlap
between actual and best practice is where quality
improvement needs to employ educational and social
sciences’ methodologies and techniques.
THE STAGE IS SET
An infant born at 26 weeks’ gestation is
admitted to a neonatal intensive care unit.
The care team prepares to carry out recom-
mended best practice, including adminis-
tering surfactant therapy. However, a nurse
on the care team has just read the results of
a randomised controlled trial published in
the New England Journal of Medicine indicating
that premature infants receiving early
continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP)
rather than surfactant are likely to survive,
but have a lower risk of adverse neonatal
outcomes.
1 The nurse has worked with the
study authors before, strongly believes in the
results and suggests to the care team that the
infant be given CPAP rather than surfactant.
However, the rest of the care team decides to




above is common in healthcare. A constantly
growing information base leads to great chal-
lenges for clinicians to keep their under-
standing and practices current. Competing
views and ﬁndings together with the time
it takes for innovations to ﬁnd their way
into routine clinical practice only add to
the challenges.
2 Before returning to our
NICU decision above, we explore some
fundamental concepts in epistemology dating
back to Plato’s ﬁrst works on the subject
through more modern interpretations to
show how these ideas are still relevant and
applicable to modern practitioners who want
to engage with the improvement agenda and
yet frequently operate under information
overload and conﬂicting data.
EPISTEMOLOGY AND JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy
generally concerned with the nature of
knowledge.
3 It asks questions such as ‘How
do we know?’ and ‘What is meaningful
knowledge?’. Understanding what it means to
have knowledge in a particular areadand the
contextsandwarrantsthatshapeknowledged
has been a fundamental quest for centuries.
In Plato’s Theaetetus, knowledge is deﬁned as
the intersection of truth and beliefdreferred
to classically as justiﬁed true belief (JTB).
4
Here, knowledge cannot be claimed if some-
thing is true but not believed or believed
but not true (ie, lacking justiﬁcation). For
example, in a Platonic sense, it may be
considered true that good hand hygiene
reduces infection rates. If a practitioner
believes good hand hygiene will lead to fewer
hospital-acquiredinfectionsasjudgedbytheir
actions, then they would have knowledge.
In its purest form, the idea of JTB would
not seem particularly practical or germane to
efforts to improve the quality of patient care,
largely because science and medicine do not
seek absolute truths in a Platonic sense, nor
can we always assess our theories and views
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The structure of improvement knowledgewith absolute certainty. The educational philosopher
John Dewey deﬁned knowledge as the ‘Conscious and
voluntary effort to establish belief upon a ﬁrm basis of
reasons’.
5 Dewey’s deﬁnition seems to ﬁt well with the
practice of modern medicinedor does it? Indeed, it is
likely that almost all healthcare professionals will claim
that their beliefs and clinical practice are grounded
upon a ﬁrm basis of reasons. However, we know many
patients receive care and treatment that is inconsistent
with the best available evidence.
6 There is always going
to be a healthy debate about what constitutes a ﬁrm basis
of reasons, or best evidence. However, if we can identify
situations where the evidence is valid, reliable, compel-
ling and generalisable, then we should expect the
actions of healthcare professionals to reﬂect and repre-
sent that evidence consistently and reliably. The high
level question facing most healthcare systems and
leaders today is how can they design knowledgeable
healthcare systems that maximise the alignment between
the current best evidence (‘truth’) and the actions of
healthcare providers (‘belief’)? Leaders must also
recognise that individual and group beliefs and behav-
iours exist within systems of care where attempts to act
on the best clinical evidence base are often thwarted by
systems poorly designed to deliver such care consistently.
One approach is to think carefully about what knowl-
edge is and to use simple models and heuristics as starting
points for reﬂection, learning and discussion. Simple
(action-oriented) models can help make what is implicit
and variable, explicit and systematic. From Plato to the
modern era, the label of knowledge has required the
demonstration of some action or application character-
istic. In fact, application is a higher order function in
Bloom’s Taxonomy of learning.
7 As Hawthorne and
Stanleypoint out, ‘the value of knowledgeis duein part to
its role as a norm for action’.
8 For example, virtually all
medical students are required to undergo some form of
apprenticeship,clinicalrotationorresidency.Thepurpose
of these experiences is for the student to demonstrate
the ability to transfer their didactic training into observ-
able actions (competencies) that are the basis of assessing
performance and continued learning. The healthcare
student demonstrating outstanding performance in the
classroom, but who cannot execute and practise their
trade (such as phlebotomy or inserting a central venous
catheter) may not be considered knowledgeable. To say
someone ‘knows’ how to perform a task when they cannot
executethetaskinpracticemaybeanexampleofwhatthe
philosopher Wittgenstein would call a ‘language trap’.
9
DEGREES OF BELIEF AND EVIDENCE
The Venn diagram in ﬁgure 1 is a modiﬁcation of Plato’s
JTB concept which relaxes the notion of truth and
provides a way to model knowledge by emphasising the
interaction of belief (demonstrated through action) and
scientiﬁc evidence. The diagram replaces the Platonic
notion of truth with scientiﬁc evidence and thereby
deﬁnes knowledge as the intersection of belief and
scientiﬁc evidence. By this deﬁnition, someone who
believes something not grounded in scientiﬁc evidence
(Dewey’s ﬁrm basis of reason) cannot have knowledge.
Conversely, someone who understands and has been
exposed to scientiﬁc evidence, but does not believe in it
(as judged by their actions) also cannot be said to have
knowledge.
This is, of course, an over-simpliﬁcation of knowledge
since there are degrees of belief and evidence. Ideally,
a clinician would hope that their degree of belief for an
intervention or treatment would be strongest for those
interventions with the strongest evidence of success.
Similarly, regulatory and accrediting bodies are usually
very careful to make sure that the indicators they use are
agreed upon, stable, scientiﬁcally sound and relatively
non-controversial.
10 Once selected, the entire process of
inspections and audits is intended to assess the align-
ment or overlap of best practice with actual practice.
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT KNOWLEDGE
Improvement science has long recognised the concept
of JTB, even if it has not explicitly or clearly acknowl-
edged this. The idea that knowledge is not simply
information about the best scientiﬁc evidence, but
rather the intersection of belief (as demonstrated by
action) and the best available scientiﬁc evidence lies at
the heart of quality improvement. The ‘Will, Ideas and
Execution’ framework promoted by the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement underlines the importance of
action or ‘Execution’ as a fundamental component of
improvement knowledge.
11 Often in quality improve-
ment efforts, rigorous and generalisable scientiﬁc
evidence is not available and the notion of generalisable
scientiﬁc evidence may be replaced by ‘Ideas’ applicable
Figure 1 An illustration of a modiﬁed version of Plato’s
Justiﬁed True Belief.
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The structure of improvement knowledgeto a local setting by those closest to the process or system
being improved. For example, an improvement team
looking to decrease wait times in their Emergency Ward
will have local knowledge of the system, practice
patterns, staff and services that are most likely to impact
delays and would need to use this information to drive
behaviour as they test different changes with the goal of
reducing wait times. This local knowledge, perhaps not
generalisable, is still reliable and valid and can serve as
a guide to action, learning and improvement. Organi-
sations may have the will to change, ideas on how to
make things better, but often struggle with execution.
12
Further, at the heart of the Deming-inspired Model for
Improvement lies the PlaneDoeStudyeAct (PDSA)
cycle developed to build knowledge and to facilitate
system improvements.
13 14 Initially, a PDSA cycle aims to
have people test a small change idea in a ‘safe’ setting.
The model aims to provide people with direct experi-
ence of whether or not a small change works in their
settingdthat is, to speciﬁcally build their understanding
(combination of prediction, data and experience) and
then to start expanding the testing as their under-
standing grows. When efforts are made to spread this
understanding and learning across an organisation or
across a number of organisations problems frequently
occur. For example, little attention is often paid to the
beliefs of people in the new setting, leading to poor
adoption of the apparently effective change.
15 It may be
important in increasing adoption of scientiﬁcally
grounded or promising local initiatives to pay attention
to increasing the understanding of people in a new
setting by, for example, continuing to facilitate the
introduction of changes in a small, safe and testable
manner. Such an approach of testing and careful
implementation and spread can lead to the creation of
a knowledgeable healthcare system.
In simplistic terms, it can be argued that the general-
isable scientiﬁc evidence of clinical interventions comes
from the clinical effectiveness research community and
an understanding of how the belief (or uptake) in these
interventions can be accelerated comes from the social
sciences. However, it is clear that the science of quality
improvement must learn and apply methods from both
clinical research and the social sciences if it is to
understand how best to maximise the overlap between
‘truth’ and ‘belief’ and to accelerate the rate of learning
and improvement.
SURFACTANT OR CPAP?
Returning to the infant described at the start of the
paper, it is worth considering to what degree best prac-
tice and actual practice overlapped. The standard prac-
tice was to administer surfactant therapy. At least one
member of the care team described a new scientiﬁc study
demonstrating CPAP to be more effective. However, the
clinical team decided to maintain current practice and
to administer surfactant. Following the model described
in this paper, the one nurse suggesting the use of CPAP
may have demonstrated understanding of the scientiﬁc
evidence base, however, because the rest of the clinical
team have experienced positive results when adminis-
tering surfactant, they do not have sufﬁciently strong
belief in the use of CPAP to change their current prac-
tice. To the extent that the use of CPAP at that time
could be viewed as the best clinical approach for this
patient based on the most current evidence available,
the team was not knowledgeable as their beliefs and
subsequent actions did not overlap with this evidence
base. Of course, the process by which the care team
over-rode the arguments of the nurse and chose surfac-
tant rather than CPAP are important to consider. From
rapid response teams to care bundles, there are some
situations where the evidence base is at times unclear
and a single agreed upon standard may not yet exist. In
such cases, the model outlined here would include
competing views that each have a degree of scientiﬁc
support. The aim of the model is not to select a best
standard from legitimate competing views, but rather to
isolate situations where belief and action are inconsistent
with a clearly identiﬁed best practice and to use this
‘alignment’ assessment as a guide to improved care
processes. In situations where clear and compelling
evidence for a standard does not exist, the goal is to
deﬁne a reasonable ‘standard in use’ for the purpose of
initiating systematic and rapid testing and learning. The
challenge of quality improvement is to ﬁgure out how to
maximise the overlap between ever-changing evidence
and practitioners’ belief in the evidence in order to
build more knowledgeable healthcare systems, within
complex team and power dynamics.
16
CONCLUSIONS
The model of improvement knowledge outlined here,
borrowed from the Greeks and extended by learning
theorists, places a premium on action as well as learning
and reﬂection. It is important within quality improve-
ment for a number of reasons. First, it shifts the concept
of knowledge away from the purely didactic, procedural
and passive form of practice to an action-oriented model
where rapid testing and learning dominate. Second, it
supports a wide range of healthcare-related activities
from improvement work to accountability models by
identifying a common goal: maximising the overlap
between what we think is the best way of doing some-
thing and what is actually done in practice. This goal is
also an important aspect of translational research.
17
i26 BMJ Qual Saf 2011;20(Suppl 1):i24ei27. doi:10.1136/bmjqs.2010.046557
The structure of improvement knowledgeThird, it clearly recognises that regulatory standards and
improvement initiatives alike must account for the
beliefs of the healthcare professionals in a particular
setting and address the factors that shape what people
actually do, not simply telling them, or mandating, what
they should be doing. In particular, improvement
involves change and this model underlines that change
requires engaging with people’s current beliefs and
ﬁnding ways in which people can test and learn from
their own experience of whether something new works
or not and to what degree. Understanding how best to
maximise the overlap between actual and best practice is
where quality improvement needs to employ educational
and social sciences’ methodologies and techniques.
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